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1.  Introduction  
 
One important way to mitigate problems in divided societies is to create an electoral system befitting of the 
situation.  In many divided societies, the state has inherited the electoral system of their colonizer. Although from the 
time of independence Sri Lanka has been recognized as a representative of democracy, it has a proud and long history 
of democracy. Periodically, experiments attempting to incorporate ethnic minorities into the political system resulted 
in further disenfranchisement stemming from recurrent struggles with the ethnic majority-dominated government.  This 
is not surprising as the majority greatly outnumbers the ethnic minorities. As history has shown, disenfranchised groups 
were always looking for tools to demand their share of resources outside the political system. This had disastrous 
consequences in the past. To break this cycle, even after a defeat of violent opposition groups, the majority should 
strive to include the ethnic minorities in the political system. Currently, the incentives that the electoral system 
generates for ethnic accommodation and interethnic dialogue are weak. While there is an ongoing debate between the 
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political elite and the public in Sri Lanka on what would be the most advantageous way to make major changes in the 
electoral system, the issue is highly contagious and the debate results in deadlocks. In the current situation and to 
prevent further instability, no major institutional changes are advisable in the short term. The desired outcome is to 
enable the current system to give greater opportunities for involvement to the minority groups, while at the same time 
assuring the majority that their interests will not be substantially compromised. As many have shown, electoral 
engineering in deeply divided societies can be challenging, and Sri Lanka in many respects exemplifies the most 
difficult case. In this context, incremental changes in the electoral system and civic education may help to bring about 
learning, stability and improved accommodation. 
This paper will examine the impact of PR electoral systems in a divided society. This research will explore the 
strength and weakness of the current electoral system and institutional design of Sri Lanka and will recommend 
changes to decrease the risk of minority exclusion in decision making and ethnic violence. The objectives of this 
research are to examine the character of the merits and demerits of the PR and to investigate and assess the impacts of 
the PR in the multi-ethnic societies of Sri Lanka. 
The study is a qualitative case study, and primary and secondary data sources have been employed to gather relevant 
data. My Fieldwork was conducted in Sri Lanka, with the intention of gaining a better and more thorough 
understanding of the current situation. The interviews conducted were as such, not structured or semi-structured, due 
to the interviewees’ varying professional background and institutional affiliation. Accordingly, unstructured 
interviews, as well as informal conversations and meetings, were conducted throughout Sri Lanka. Both primary and 
secondary sources of data have been used and analyzed throughout the study. The former includes official documents, 
as the constitution of Sri Lanka, political statements, reports, and interviews. The latter includes scholarly literature as 
research reports and analysis, comments and newspaper articles, as well as theoretical literature in the field. Both the 
primary and secondary sources have been vital for my understanding of the historical background to the conflict and 
the current situation.  
 
The Power of Electoral Systems 
 
Electoral systems are the ‘most powerful lever of political engineering for conflict resolution’ (Horowitz, 1997). 
This is because it determines how votes translate into seats in the legislature (Reilly, 2007) and thereby determining 
many aspects of the functioning of democracy: what the parties look like, who is represented and by whom, and 
‘ultimately who governs’ (Reynolds, 1999). Therefore, the electoral system is the gateway to power in a democracy. 
It can be manipulated to ‘foster accommodative behavior’ by ensuring that groups are included in the political process 
by ‘decreasing the incidence of zero-sum outcomes (Reilly, 1997a). Furthermore, by changing the incentives available 
to those seeking election, electoral rules ‘can make some types of behavior more politically rewarding than others, 
making it possible to incentivize inclusiveness and moderation (Reilly, 2002). Thus, the electoral system is 
foundational to the political culture in a society; it determines from the beginning on which lines an election will be 
run. It is absolutely necessary for it to foster both inclusiveness and moderation so that stability can follow. While 
getting this right is only one part of the quest for stability, getting it wrong can make stability impossible. 
 
 
2.  Research Methods 
 
The present study applied the qualitative methods. All data is analyzed descriptively. It is used a paraphrase to 
explain, elaborate, and explore regarding the phenomenon belonging. The conclusion is the last remarked based on the 
previous discussion and result. 
 
 
3.  Results and Analysis 
 
Discussion  
 
3.1 Political Representation  
 
Political Representation and Representative Institutions ‘Political representation’ refers to an arrangement of 
government in which the constituency does not participate directly in the democratic processes, but are represented by 
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formal and elected representatives. The representatives have the responsibility of acting according to the people’s 
interests, however, not necessarily according to their wishes. Dahl (1998, 85). Political representation stipulates, as 
mentioned, the representation of the constituency by elected officials, and it is the electoral system that designates the 
translation accuracy of the votes and the composition of the parliament seats. The proportionality of the people’s votes 
and the composition of the elected officials in parliament may vary according to different electoral systems. Reilly & 
Reynolds (1999, 20) have categorized various electoral systems into eleven main types, which again fall into three 
broader families, by grouping them according to their degree of proportionality. The three broader families are 
respectively, referred to as ‘plurality-majority systems’, ‘semi-proportional systems’, and ‘proportional representation 
systems’. 
 
 
3.2 Divided societies   
 
Divided societies are those in which there is an ethnic difference among the people in a state. Additionally, these 
ethnic differences must determine politics and political parties. There are two main types of inter-ethnic divisions: 
ranked and unranked. In ranked systems, the ethnic groups are geographically intermixed, ethnicity determines 
economic status, and one group dominates the other. In unranked systems, the ethnic groups live in enclaves, race does 
not determine jobs, and the groups are parallel, not hierarchical (Mason, 2003).  In unranked systems, the groups are 
so separated from each other that Horowitz describes their relationship as more similar to international relations than 
intra-state relations (1971).  
Ethnic conflict in ranked systems is rare since the dominant group tends to have so much power relative to the 
weaker groups that if a conflict arose, the dominant group would be able to suppress the revolt with few problems.  
Additionally, it is very difficult for the subordinate group to become a feasible opposition since their lower position 
means that they have less access to funds and have increased problems in mobilization.  In unranked systems, groups 
tend to have conflict over government control. 
This is because in a parliamentary system or coalition, whichever party wins the most seats controls the 
government—both the legislative and executive branches, producing a zero-sum game. Ethnically based political 
parties will thus encourage people to vote along ethnic lines, and by employing inflammatory comments and platforms, 
the potential for conflict and insecurity increases.  This demands full participation of voters, and those who vote against 
their ethnic party or do not vote may be targeted for recrimination.  This is less likely in a presidential system since 
there is a balance of power (assuming that the legislative branch has the power to balance the president). 
The impact of political representation on an ethnically divided or multi-ethnic society depends on the particular 
political framing and the institutional design. Especially majoritarian democracies constitute a certain risk of turning 
non-democratic when placed on the backdrop of an ethnically divided society. According to Luckham et al. (2003), 
the institutional design of a majoritarian system most regularly features a strong presidential or parliamentary rule, 
first-past-the-post elections, unicameral or bicameral legislatures with a weak second chamber, a weak constitutional 
division of power, and a unitary, centralized state structure. Within a context of an ethnically divided society, such 
institutional frames can under certain circumstances produce non-democratic politics under certain circumstances. 
Majoritarian institutions have a potential of being exploited in order to obtain political power. A majoritarian political 
institutional framework can facilitate the exclusion of minorities from political power and decision-making process 
unsatisfactory minority protection, and the manipulation of ethnicity in politics. 
 
 
3.3 Sri Lankan Scenario  
 
Sri Lanka has substantial experience with both electoral systems (FPP and PR) at different points of time. 
According to A. J. Wilson, "Ceylon is the ideal laboratory for the study of electoral behavior." Over the years, many 
significant changes have been brought about in its electoral system. From the pre-independence period to 1977, the 
Island followed the FPP system, introduced by the British. During this period, the electoral system was gradually 
developed by the expansion of the franchise and change in the electoral arrangement. The United National Party, UNP 
government, however, completely changed the system by introducing the PR system in 1978 after formed new 
government. 
As the UNP controlled more than two-thirds of parliament, the party was able to enact the second constitution in 
less than one decade. The constitution of the Second Republic of Sri Lanka did to some degree strengthen the status 
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of rights and protection of minorities, though still with severe limitations (Little, 1999). At the same time, the new 
constitution of 1978 set forth to transform the political system by adding emphasis on the presidency. The presidency, 
directly elected from the constituency, would collaborate with parliament and prime minister, much similar to the 
French political system. Even though the parliament would be in charge of the legislative tasks the president would 
have the significant powers over parliament and prime minister. The president obtained control of emergency powers 
and the power to dissolve parliament. According to Coomaraswamy (2003), this presidential system would define the 
politics of Sri Lanka into the 1980s and -90s.    
Sri Lanka offers a paradigmatic case to illustrate the perverse effect that democratic politics can have in an 
ethnically divided society. In the wake of independence, the state island witnessed a progressive escalation in an inter-
ethnic conflict that led to a protracted civil war lasting three decades and costing the lives of a hundred thousand 
people. Although a multifaceted and convoluted conflict, the political system bequeathed to Sri Lanka by the British 
can be said to have had “a crucial impact on the exacerbation of the conflict”. (Bose, 1994).  
Post-independence democracy in Sri Lanka was designed as a majoritarian democracy, including the typical 
elements as such. The system adopted in 1947 included a strong parliament, a unitary, centralized state, weak division 
of power, and a first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral system. The combination of an FPP representational system and the 
lack of a bill of rights led to the inefficient protection of minorities in the society (Rotberg, 1999). Contrary to 
proportional representation (PR) in elections, FPP systems may be problematic in heterogeneous societies. In Sri 
Lanka, FPP elections and the single-member-district plurality, a ‘winner-takes-it-all’ method of election, created 
further majority domination within the political system. The minority Tamil constituencies did not have enough 
leverage in the electoral system to oppose the majority in any way. “…[C]onstitutions were enacted by ruling 
governments and amended to serve their self-interest” (Coomaraswamy, 2003).    
Upon independence, it became clear that the Sinhalese, with their approximately 70 percent of the total population, 
easily could easily obtain the majority in parliament as long as they voted along ethnic lines (International Crisis Group, 
2007b; Horowitz, 1993). And indeed, it was the Sinhalese who that obtained majority in parliament after independence, 
hence they had also control over the development of the political framework. Through the safeguard clause, the first 
constitution of Sri Lanka placed certain limitations on the legislative powers of parliament as to impede discriminatory 
legislation (Loganathan, 1996). However, three legislative acts passed in the post-independence era were perceived as 
highly discriminatory by the groups affected. These were respectively the Citizenship Act of 1948, the Franchise 
Legislation of 1949, and the Official Language Law of 1956 (Uyangoda, 2001).    
In an ethnic party system like Sri Lanka’s in which group preferences are predominantly fixed and little or no cross-
cutting cleavages exist, any party across each group will be incentivized to appeal exclusively to its own community 
for votes by engaging in emotive and exclusive ethnic appeals (Horowitz 1985). Essentially, intra-ethnic parties 
contend by outbidding each other on the political spectrum and any effort to moderate their political stance or engage 
in inter-ethnic pacts will render them susceptible to electorally detrimental accusations of treachery. This creates a 
centrifugal spiral in which extremist positions become electorally rewarding and the prospects for multi-ethnic 
coalitions unlikely. 
The PR system, with its territorially designated electoral districts, ensured that Sinhalese parties could permanently 
gain a plurality-majority of votes due to the fact that minority constituted less than 25% of the electorate in 75% of the 
nation-wide Sinhalese constituencies. In addition, this system had the particularity of creating “vast manufactured 
majorities” as it magnified “relatively slender pluralities of the national vote into the disproportionately large majority 
of seats” in parliament 
The members of parliament are elected from 22 multi-member districts through a proportional preferential election 
system.  Voters first indicate their choice of the party on the ballot, and may then indicate their three preferences from 
the party candidates list. The parliament has 225 members who are elected for a maximum term of six years.  According 
to Article 98 of the Constitution, 196 members are directly elected. The remaining 29 members of parliament are 
elected in a countywide constituency. The political parties or independent groups for the national seats submit a list of 
candidates to the Election Commissioner.                                            
PR aims to achieve a balance between the share of votes and the subsequent share of representatives. If a party 
wins a certain percent of the votes, the same party should win approximately the same percentage of the parliamentary 
seats (Reilly & Reynolds, 1999). The most common form of PR in elections is the list PR-system, implying that all 
parties are required to present a list of candidates for the electorate. List PR elections are commonly held in large, 
multi-member constituencies, and the parties receive seats according to their share of the national vote. Countries with 
a list PR- system operates either with open or closed lists, in which the former the constituents vote directly for a party, 
contrary to the latter where the electors vote on candidates whose votes pool to a specific party. As will be discussed 
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later, the case of Sri Lanka may illustrate how the choice and design of the electoral system influence the 
proportionality of political representation. 
 
 
3.4 PR and emergence of Extremist Parties 
 
A criticism of PR is that, by making it easier for smaller parties and extremist to win seats in parliament, these 
systems facilitate the rise of extremist parties. So, ethnic politics in Sri Lanka is closely linked to the structure of the 
Electoral system. This not only increases the risk of huge parliaments, with governments being hostage to the vagaries 
of extremist politicians, more generally it also affects the stability of the political system by giving undue representation 
to politicians and parties whose views are abhorrent to the majority of citizens. (David M.Farrell, 2011). In a context 
of the rise of the Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist party the ideology of which contained a political vision of using the 
post-independence state institutions to serve the interests of the majority Sinhalese community. They viewed the post-
independent rule discriminating the Sinhalese-Buddhists and favoring ethnic and religious minorities. This meant that 
the state policies should specifically serve the Sinhalese language, Buddhist religion, and the Sinhalese-Buddhist 
culture. (Uyangoda, Wijewardena, D. C., 1953). In 2004s, a new coalition – Jathika Hela Urmaya – JHU -- the 
Nationalist Heritage Party, which was formed just two months before the elections in order to contest the April 2004 
election and won nine seats. The party campaign slogans make its ethnic nature clear it explicitly targeted anti-minority 
sentiments. 
The Sinhalese nationalist party feels that the existing PR system has forced major political parties to form coalition 
governments with minorities party is seen by them. It has created political instability, instead of envisaged stability, 
and the smaller parties have gained an undue advantage over major parties because the major party is compelled to 
depend on the former for survival. The party pledged to preserve Sri Lanka's unitary status, force the Norwegian 
facilitators out of the country and to establish a Dharma Rajya (righteous state) (Neil DeVotta and Jason Stone, 2008) 
Its disdain for the Christian community further fuelled communal disharmony. The emergence of religious 
fundamentalism has had an impact on the handling of women’s issues by the legislature. There have been instances 
where progressive political trends in government were high jacked or subverted by the intrusion of religious 
fundamentalism. For instance, Buddhist priests who entered parliament through the JHU, right-wing Sinhala nationalist 
party, vehemently opposed the Prevention of Domestic Violence Bill when it was presented to parliament on the basis 
that the Bill adversely affected the values of the “Sinhala” tradition as the law was westernized and not suitable for Sri 
Lankan culture. (South Asia for Human Rights: 2008). Hence, JHU came into power committing itself to implement 
the Sinhalese nationalist political agenda with major Sinhalese party.  
 
 
3.5 The Electoral System and the Presidential Power  
 
The Presidential form and the PR electoral system were the significant inclusions in the 1978 Constitution of Sri 
Lanka. The present constitution is weighted heavily in favor of the executive President. (Wiswa Warnapala.W.A, 
1995). The main objective of the introduction of the presidential system, as stated by the UNP in 1977, was that "the 
executive power will be vested in the President elected from time to time by the people, and this will ensure stability 
to the executive for a period of years between elections".  He has absolute powers, like the legislature and the judiciary. 
(The constitution 1978, 1979) With this constitutional amendment, Parliament lost its centrality in the constitutional 
structure of Sri Lanka. 
The executive President cannot, however, enjoy his/her power without the cooperation of the parliamentary 
majority. The elected President is always answerable to the people who elected him/her. Constitutionally, the 
governmental powers of legislative and executive are divided between Parliament and President respectively, but the 
presidential power is pervasive in all institutions of government.  It has been said that the Sri Lankan Presidency is the 
most powerful in the world. At the same time, the President cannot implement his/her executive powers unless 
supported by a parliamentary majority. The recent experience of Sri Lanka illustrates this situation. (D.C. Ranatunga, 
2002). 
Furthermore, the presidency introduced was given much power compared to the parliamentarians and the prime 
minister and became the main constitutional institution. Established with the intention to break the repeated 
constitutional tampering by parliament, the PR system and the presidency, however, led to It becomes clear then, that 
the representative institutions of Sri Lanka repeatedly have failed to provide minority groups with the necessary 
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political inclusion and democratic latitude required for institutionalizing peaceful cooperation and conflict resolution 
within democratic frames unstable coalition governments unable to perform any potentially necessary constitutional 
innovations. 
 
 
3.6 Defections and Crossover 
 
In the present electoral system, more primacy has been given to the parties than to the MPs. When selecting 
candidates for an election, most members are at the mercy of the party leaders. Even after being elected to the 
parliament, MPs will have to support the party decision rather than acting on their conscience.  In this context, MPs 
do not have much option other than crossing over to another party that allows them to voice the concerns of their 
communities or adheres to one’s conscience. Note also that “crossing the floor” sometimes refers merely to voting 
with the opposition, not to changing party affiliation…. changing parties is more commonly called the party 
“switching.”  (Kenneth Janda, 2009). That in some countries party defections “is a non-issue and not perceived as a 
problem,” whereas in others the practice threatens government stability and is taken as very serious.  
One possible explanation is the accumulation of an excessive quantum of power in the hands of the executive 
president. As the President himself is elected, he then has a free reign for the next six years, no matter what the 
composition of parliament is. He is also the distributor of goodies vis-a-vis cabinet portfolios, giving him the 
opportunity to indulge in political philandering. 
Faced with such a situation, opposition members of parliament are more liable to fall prey to the political 
machinations of their manipulators. It is such a scenario that the UNP is confronted with today. 
However, when analyzing the history of crossing over, usually it has been the opposition MPs who cross over to 
the ruling party instead of otherwise. Some get cabinet portfolios with other privileges while others allegedly receive 
huge sums of money. Therefore, it is very difficult to decide whether it is principle or perks that matter when deciding 
to crossover. Huge sums of money exchange hands under the pretext of defections on the basis of conscience, which 
in reality are for political gains and lead to corrupt practices. The defection of the opposition legislators today could 
well be a crucial development in Sri Lanka's fragile democracy. The development has put in danger the landmark deal 
between the two major Sinhalese parties. 
Since political crossovers have now become the order of the day, prompted by various factors with its notable 
origin in Sri Lanka, followed by a series of expulsions, by-elections, resignations, and termination or rather forfeiture 
of the seats in Parliament due to a plethora of reasons. The political crossover apparently began with S W R D 
Bandaranaike, who was Minister of Health and Local Government and Leader of the House under D. S. Senanayake. 
SWRD resigned from the portfolio on July 12, 1951, joined the Opposition and later formed his own political party 
called Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Since then, crossovers have been part and parcel of the Sri Lankan political 
landscape. What is important is that the crossovers between 1951 to 965 had no links to perks bribes and other factors 
except the disagreement in policies. (Shenali D Waduge, 2014). The crossovers after 1965 were all to do with bribes, 
perks, and privileges and even to avoid legal cases against them. 
Sometimes, as in the case of minority parties such as the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Ceylon 
Workers Congress (CWC), if the leaders become disgruntled with partners of their alliance, the entire party tends to 
crossover as a single unit. Crossovers can make or break governments. We have seen that happen throughout our 
history. Even before the presidential election of 2015, speculation about crossovers among both government and 
opposition ranks have gained increasing coverage. 
It is really difficult to count the number of crossovers over the years but most of the crossovers have been from the 
UNP to ruling parties in recent past. The defection of 35 members of the Sri Lankan opposition, the United National 
Party, to the People’s Alliance of president Chandrika Kumaratunga is a major step towards the formation of a “national 
government” as the ruling regime faces its deepest political crisis since coming to power in 1994. ( K. Ratnayake,1999). 
But surprisingly, it has been left in the opposition for a long period now under Ranil Wickremesinghe's leadership and 
the general belief is that the present leadership is responsible for all the recent crossovers which have weakened the 
party. (Jaliya Wijeyekoon, 2010) 
Crossovers are not an evil of the proportional representation system. They occurred under the first past the post 
system as well.   If the crossovers of yesteryear were on matters of principle whereas the crossovers of today, at least 
from Opposition to Government, result in immediate ministerial portfolios, it is a commentary on the caliber of MPs 
then and now, not an indictment of the system. 
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A radical move would be to amend the Constitution to prohibit MPs who crossover from the Opposition to the 
Government from accepting ministerial office during the remainder of the parliamentary term. This would take away 
any suspicion in the public mind with regard to the motives for their crossover and would require such MPs to vindicate 
their stand before their voters at the next parliamentary election before becoming eligible to hold ministerial office. 
However such a move would require an altruistic attitude on the part of the Government in power, and no Government 
has shown such altruism up to date. (Ruana Rajepakse, 2010) 
 
 
3.7 Government Stability and Coalition government 
 
PR electoral systems have a greater tendency to produce coalition governments that, by their nature, are bound to 
be more fragile than the single-party majority governments more normally associated with non-PR systems. Coalition 
governments are also often criticized by opponents of PR for being ‘undemocratic’ (Hain1986; Duschinsky 1999; 
Norton 1997). There are a number of parts to this argument.   
The coalition is also said to be undemocratic because they make a mockery of manifesto pledge. Coalitions are 
produced perhaps before or after the election as a result of clandestine meetings between party leaders. The expectation 
in a coalition system is that fewer pledge will be fulfilled, because of policy compromises between parties that must 
be made in order to form a government. (Gallagher et al. 2006, David M. Farrel. 2001). At the heart of this, once again, 
is the issue of how governments are made and unmade not as a direct result of the popular vote, but rather as a result 
of the wheeling and dealing that goes on between party leaders. In particular, attention is often focused on the ‘pivotal’ 
role or ‘kingmaker’ role tiny parties, such as notably the SLMC, CWC, JHU, left parties have enjoyed long 
uninterrupted periods in government despite having a tiny vote. 
To ensure a more stable system reflecting the votes of the constituencies more accurately than before. By 
establishing PR the voice and leverage of minority groups increased, and the legislative power was restrained through 
coalition building. Under PR, it is more difficult to obtain a massive majority in parliament, and a two- thirds majority 
is virtually out of reach. As such, the system prevents constitutional tampering by ‘unbridled legislatures’ 
(Coomaraswamy, 2003). The introduction of PR shifted the dynamics in majority Sinhalese politics to a certain extent 
from the ‘ethnic outbidding’ to bargaining for positions in the political center. Despite the fact that the PR system was 
established to ensure improved reflection of the voting patterns, it also led to a less stable system of weak coalition 
governments. Unstable governments with decreased endurance and bargaining powers based on partisan politics have 
reduced possibilities of constitutional reform. Weak coalition governments will have a reduced ability to attain the 
necessary two- thirds majority required for constitutional reform, as they do not have the majority of the parliament’s 
votes. The combination of weak coalition governments unable to obtain the majority required for constitutional reform 
and the political practice of ‘opportunistic opposition’ have undermined various peace initiatives (Shanmugaratnam & 
Stokke, 2008).    
Although, the PR system makes it more difficult to obtain a massive majority in parliament; the political parties 
had to resolve to coalition building to reach the necessary majority threshold. This has functioned as an impediment to 
the ‘constitutional tampering’ exercised by parliamentary majorities; nevertheless, it has also led to an era of unstable 
and weak coalition governments (Coomaraswamy 2003; Goodhand et al. 2005). Parties in coalitions have decreased 
expected endurance and less bargaining powers, hence, the coalition governments became subsequently weaker and 
did not obtain the power to implement constitutional amendments. 
The real grievance of minorities concerning governance was not about the lack of representation, but the fact that 
even with the adequate representation they had been excluded from the sphere of state power. The two main Sinhalese 
political parties who formed governments alternatively had essentially implemented a policy agenda that favored the 
Sinhalese majority. Even on occasions when the support of the Tamil parties was obtained to form coalition 
governments, the majoritarian public policy regime had rarely changed. (Uyangoda,n.d) 
 
 
3.8 Preferential voting  
 
The method of preferential voting built into Sri Lanka’s PR system is the other feature of the electoral system that 
has received a great deal of flack for justifiable reasons. Experience shows that it spawns corruption, blood violence, 
and leads to severe infighting even among candidates of the same party list. (Uyangoda, 2015)   
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Unfortunately, the present form of PR has resulted in an inevitable struggle for preferential votes, and in-fighting 
among candidates of the same party (intra-party rivalry), which has on many occasions led to criminal violence and 
even murder. According to Laksiri Fernando the preferential vote system how to affect the societies. He said 
“Many of the ills that we see in our political system today can be traced to the much-maligned electoral system and 
election laws, both practiced and malpractice. All recent election monitors, national and international, were unanimous 
that major election violence and violations were due to the ‘rotten manage’ (Preference vote) competitions. Under the 
present system, the candidates tend to use colossal amounts of money and then try to recover them through most 
insidious ways. Corruption is the whole mark at both ends. Only the rich or those who depend on the rich can easily 
contest elections from major parties. If there are exceptions, they are few and far between. The culprits are not only 
the people but also the systems. The ills are systemic” (Laksiri Fernando, 2015) 
 This system has hence paved the way for the drug lords, gambling tycoons and numerous other unscrupulous 
elements engaged in illegal activities with a lot of black money at their disposal to spend ample amounts of this ill-got 
money to put forward their own henchmen to contest the elections. If these elements manage to win, which in most 
cases they do by bribing the voters and engaging in numerous illegal methods, these illegal businessmen then use them 
to engage in their illegal activities and escape the long arm of the law. (Camelia Nathanial, 2015) 
 
 
3.9 Ethnic line of voting 
 
By the fact that prior to 1978, minorities especially many Muslim politicians representing national parties have 
been elected in predominantly Sinhalese electorates, while Buddhist Sinhalese MP also has been elected in mixed  
Muslim-Sinhalese electorates, though voters readily lent their support to any politicians in all electorates based on their 
leadership quality and party. It was definitely not the case of Muslims voting for a candidate merely because he is a 
Muslim. Unlike the Tamils, the Muslims did not demonstrate a tendency to vote along communal lines. 
The new Constitution enacted by the UNP in 1978 did irreparable damage to Sinhalese-Muslim relations, the effects 
of which are continuing to reverberate even today, primarily due to the introduction of the ‘Preference Vote’. As in the 
pre-1978 era, the Muslims have begun to demonstrate their willingness to cast their votes for candidates who in their 
opinion will look after the interests of the Muslim community – specifically, the non-violation of the basic need of 
Muslims for physical safety. The ethnicity and religion of such candidates are of secondary importance to a minority 
group which constitutes less than 10% of the total population. (Bisthan Batcha, 2015) 
From a situation where a candidate had to impress upon a cross-section of multi-ethnic voters that the policies of 
his party are more beneficial to the country at large than that of a rival party, he had to now further convince voters 
that of all the candidates of his party contesting a specific area, he is the one best suited to represent them. In other 
words, the candidate had to project himself as being significantly different from the rest of the flock. To use a common 
marketing term, he had to possess a Unique Selling Proposition (USP), something that gives him a competitive edge 
over the other candidates. Consciously due to the introduction of the ‘Preference Vote’. 
Consciously or sub-consciously, many candidates began to play the ethnic card and/or the religious card as they 
directed their efforts and limited (cognitive and financial) resources at the group that constitutes over 70% of Voters – 
the Sinhala Buddhists – in their desperate bid to possess this much-sought-after USP. At the end of the day, the cost 
of marketing themselves to Sinhala Buddhist voters was considerably less than marketing themselves to a target group 
of multi-ethnic Voters. 
By the late 1990s, voter survey data shows the signiﬁcant alignment of voters along ethnic lines: Sinhalese voters 
were overwhelmingly more like to vote for the Sinhalese candidates while Muslims and Tamils predominantly voted 
for their own candidates respectively. While similar data is unavailable for earlier years electoral data suggests an 
increase in the ethnicization of voting patterns since 1989. 
Moreover, the Sinhalese-dominated constituencies in the south made it easy for Sinhalese parties to acquire the 
necessary majority in parliament if the voters voted according to ethnicity. Thus, the strong inter-party competition 
between the two main Sinhalese parties, the SLFP, and the UNP, initiated a habit of appealing for Sinhalese votes by 
ethnic sentiments and featured the performance of ‘opportunistic opposition’ (Horowitz, 1994). This paves the way for 
a plural, multi-ethnic society placed on the backdrop of a majoritarian democracy with a strong nationalist majoritarian 
dominance may, as in the case of Sri Lanka, produce ethnic fragmentation (Bastian & Luckham, 2003).  
Paradoxically, at the same time as the state institutions proved to be exclusionary by denying minority groups 
political leverage and voice, the Sinhalese majority has since independence emphasized the unitary state of Sri Lanka. 
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The conflicting relationship between majority-minority on one hand, and exclusion and communalism on the other, 
has indeed been a driving force behind the ethnic divisions and fragmentation in Sri Lankan society.    
 
 
3.10 Electoral Reforms 
 
The common notion in the country at present is that Electoral reforms are a long-awaited need. According to 
political analysts the existing Proportional Representation (PR) system, has many flaws that have only paved the way 
for those with the capacity to spend, being able to contest at elections.  (Camelia Nathanial, 2015). Sri Lanka’s debate 
on electoral reform has often highlighted the need to further democratize the existing structures and processes of 
electoral representation. (Uyangoda, 2015). Meanwhile, the public debate on electoral reforms began in the 1990s and 
later gathered momentum in a context which can be described as the crisis of Sri Lanka’s representative democracy. It 
is a crisis evolved as specific to Sri Lanka, and is independent of what political theory describes as ‘cr isis of 
representative democracy.’ The latter refers to the negative consequences for democracy arising out of the separation 
of the elected from the electors, once an election is over. (Uyangoda, 2015) The SLFP has already appointed a 
committee to work out electoral reforms in consultation with the Elections Department. The Government is expected 
to opt for a simple delimitation process, while under the proposed system, the geographical expanse and the expanse 
of the voter population of the electorates will be considered in delimitating their boundaries. According to the proposed 
the new system, boundaries of electorates with more than 100,000 voters each or less than 50,000 will be delimitated. 
Under the proposed system, electorates with less than 50,000 voters are expected to be amalgamated. 
Now there are 16 proposals discussed in detail and we are in possession of a document that everyone is comfortable 
with, or at least not opposing. Some of the basic proposals are that 250 members for the council, replace the PR system 
with the past the post system etc. Now all 16 proposals have been tied into one political proposal where 168 members 
will be elected from the first past the post system and there will be 29 elected from the national list and the remaining 
from the total of 250 will come from the PR system. (Camelia Nathanial, 2015). Therefore we are very hopeful that 
these electoral reforms will be implemented for good governance, otherwise, the same corrupt unethical politics will 
still prevail if the PR system is not replaced. 
As a consequence of the 1978 constitutional reforms, the political dynamics shifted to a certain extent away from 
the contentious ethnic outbidding. PR systems conventionally make it more strenuous for political parties to obtain a 
massive majority in parliament due to the particular electoral design. As such, the parties are forced to collaborate in 
coalitions to win the necessary majority and obtain parliamentary power. Moreover, minority parties gain a stronger 
leverage in the political system, as they under PR may have the potential to decide the outcome of elections by 
supporting one of the majority parties. Hence, as every constituency and each vote ideally count under PR, political 
parties ought to be more restrained in their ethnic appeals (Horowitz 1993). To obtain the necessary minority support 
in order to reach the majority threshold, majority parties in a PR system would ideally benefit from ethnic moderation.  
The transition from FPP to PR in elections has been argued to force political parties to be more receptive to ethnic 
accommodation, and more moderate in their ethnic appeals. However, even though the majority parties acknowledged 
the minority parties’ potential to be decisive in election outcomes, the practice of utilizing majority Sinhalese 
nationalism in politics have continued into the contemporary politics of Sri Lanka. As Shanmugaratnam (2002) has 
observed regarding the period after 1977: “At times, these [minority] groups proved to be critical in tipping the balance 
of power one way or the other, often they remained marginalized and, in certain periods, almost totally ineffectual”. 
Furthermore, according to Bastian (2003), the implementation of PR had the objective to consolidate the political 
power within the larger, majoritarian parties. One of the proposed principal elements of the PR system articulated a 
twelve point five percent ‘cut-off’ point, making it nearly impossible for smaller parties to obtain parliament seats 
without entering into coalitions with the larger parties. Without the minimum percentage required the parties would 
not be eligible for seats in parliament and would be eliminated from power. This was to avoid a recurring consequence 
of PR, namely the proliferation of smaller parties. However, this was after much protest changed to a minimum 
requirement of five percent of the votes, hence making the smaller parties more significant in the parliamentary politics. 
Yet, the dominating two-party system continued to dominate Sri Lankan politics, emphasizing the Sinhalese majority 
power furthermore. 
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4.  Conclusion  
 
This paper’s analysis of the impacts of PR system in multi-ethnic societies of Sri Lanka has clearly illustrated that 
even in instances where the elements deemed necessary for multi-ethnic societies may exist the quality of the practice 
of the system is heavily dependent on political and socio-economic factors. As revealed by the study it is evident that 
the PR system cannot be translated into an institutional checklist since focusing excessively on institutions and 
institutional change, while ignoring the politics of ethnicity change and the will to engage in democratic governance, 
will be disastrous.      
Post-independence politics in Sri Lanka have been dominated by a tendency towards a bipolar party system short 
of consensus between the parties (Uyangoda, 2007b). Despite the formal democratic institutions of Sri Lanka being in 
place, the majoritarian democracy, and the democratic deficits have left governments unconstrained and thus able to 
rule without concern for minority parties, throughout the post-independence era. Politically empowered an indignant 
majority ethnic group to gain hegemonic power and use it to install a system of governance that gave primacy to the 
interests of the Sinhalese community. The segregation of minority groups from the political, democratic sphere and 
the lack of minority safeguards have indeed engendered fragmentation and deepening of ethnic divisions in society. 
The majority have been given free reins to employ ethnically based rhetoric to obtain votes, due to deficient minority 
safeguards.  
As the ethnic party system developed, political entrepreneurs found it electorally optimal to adopt sectarian policies 
as attempts to formulate inter-ethnic appeals of accommodation were politically amputating. The unambiguous desire 
for political parties to maximize their share of votes made it politically irrational to promulgate policies of inter-ethnic 
co-existence as evidenced by the abrogation of the two Sinhalese- Tamil pacts.  
Because of the majoritarian system minorities have not been able to attain any significant power in parliament as 
to defy and mobilize against such political practice. Additionally, as the distinct system served to reward those actors 
playing the ethnic card, and thus punishing those who refrained from it, the political opportunism created incentives 
to take advantage of the ethnic cleavages in society.    
The political design of the main representative institutions in post-independence Sri Lanka has contributed to 
deepening the ethnic divisions in society by the exclusion of minority groups from the political sphere. The minority 
Tamils have in particular experienced the ‘democratic deficits’ of the majoritarian rule, thus generating a ‘legitimate’ 
cause for the violent insurgency. The centralistic nature of the state structure has additionally impeded equal political 
representation for all. The majority elite has been overrepresented, compared to minority groups who have been 
excluded from political power and processes of decision making.    
To conclude, it has been shown that the choice of an appropriate electoral system is a necessary part of securing 
stability in a divided society. The wrong choice of electoral system can have a powerful negative effect, leaving the 
conflict worse off among the multi societies. As well as preventing further escalation of the divide, an appropriate 
electoral system can create powerful incentives for moderate methods. Since it is at the foundation of the democratic 
system, incentives to moderate can work at the voter level and throughout society, making the electoral system a key 
determinant of a country’s political culture. However, the electoral system is not a panacea, it cannot change the 
composition of the society to which it is applied, and must work around these limitations. 
 
 
Foot Notes 
 
The President is head of the state, head of the executive, head of the government, and Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces. He/ she is the head of the Cabinet. He/ she appoints the Prime Minister, determines the number and 
portfolio of Ministers and may remove a Minister from office. The President may assign to himself/herself any subject 
not assigned to any other minister. He/she appoints the Provincial Governors, ambassadors and other diplomatic agents 
and secretaries to Ministers. The President is responsible for declaring war and peace. He/ she is responsible to 
Parliament in the exercise of his/her powers and functions. The President has the right to attend and address Parliament 
but cannot vote. He/ she has the power to prorogue Parliament and may dissolve Parliament any time after a lapse of 
one year from the date of last general election. See Tlze Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka- 1978, n. 22, pp. 19-54 
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